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List of key terms 
Capacity factor The output of generating units or systems, averaged over time, expressed 




Demand Response is customer load that can be voluntarily reduced in 
response to incentives at critical times, such as at times of peak demand, 
high pool prices or low reserve conditions on the power system. 
Dispatchable 
generation 
Dispatchable generation refers to generators that can be scheduled to run 
and increase or decrease their output to meet changing demand or the 
changing needs of the power system. Some dispatchable sources can do 
this quickly and effectively, such as hydro-electricity, gas power plants and 
battery storage. Other dispatchable sources, such as coal-fired generators, 
can be scheduled to run, but cannot change output as quickly or flexibly. 
Flexible 
demand 
Flexible demand refers to customers’ loads that can be relatively easily 
reduced or shifted in response to variable prices or other incentives.  It can 
include loads such as pumping, water heating, crushing and grinding, 
aluminium smelting, battery and electric vehicle charging, some 
refrigeration, etc.   
Firm capacity  Firm capacity is the amount of energy available for production or 
transmission which can be relied upon to be available at any given time, for 




A Low Reserve Condition (LRC) notice is issued when, for the nominated 
period, AEMO considers there are insufficient short-term capacity reserves 
available. This capacity must be sufficient to provide complete replacement 
of the contingency capacity reserve when a critical single credible 
contingency event occurs in the nominated period.  








Medium Term Projected Assessment of System Adequacy is the primary 
tool used to assess the expected supply and demand of electricity for a 
period of 24 months from the coming Sunday. 
Peak demand Peak demand describes the period of highest customer requirement for 
electrical power. Major spikes in demand occur during heat waves and cold 
winter days when we turn on appliances to cool or warm our homes, 




A generating system that typically runs only when demand (and spot market 
price) is high. These systems usually have relatively lower capital costs, but 
usually higher operating costs, and very fast start up and shutdown times 
compared with base load and intermediate systems. 
Power system 
security 
The safe scheduling, operation, and control of the power system on a 
continuous basis in accordance with the principles set out in clause 4.2.6 (of 
the National Energy Regulator). 
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Reliability  The probability that plant, equipment, a system, or a device, will perform 
adequately for the period of time intended, under the operating conditions 
encountered. Also, the expression of a recognised degree of confidence 
that an event or action will occur when expected. 
Reliability 
Standard 
The power system reliability benchmark set by the Reliability Panel. The 
maximum permissible unserved energy (USE), or the maximum allowable 
level of electricity at risk of not being supplied to consumers, due to 
insufficient generation, bulk transmission or flexible demand, is 0.002% of 







The actions taken by AEMO in accordance with clause 3.20 (of the NER) to 
ensure reliability of supply by negotiating and entering into contracts to 
secure the availability of reserves under reserve contracts. 
These actions may be taken when: 
• reserve margins are forecast to fall below minimum reserve levels (MRLs),  
• a market response appears unlikely. 
Unserved 
energy (USE) 
The amount of energy required by customers that cannot be supplied 
because demand exceeds supply.  Under the provisions of the Reliability 
Standard, each region’s annual USE can be no more than 0.002% of its 
annual energy consumption. Compliance is assessed by comparing the 10-
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Executive summary 
The electricity sector in transition  
The electricity sector, in Australia and around the world, is experiencing its most fundamental 
transition since the mass provision of electricity more than half a century ago. This transition 
involves the rise of renewable energy and in particular, variable output solar and wind power, a 
shift from centralised to decentralised supply of electricity and a much greater role for smarter, 
more controllable and more efficient consumption. A key driver of this transition is the need to 
reduce the sector’s greenhouse gas emissions in order to reduce the risks of climate change. 
Two critical questions in this transition are:  
• How do we best manage the retirement of existing coal-fired power stations as they 
reach the ends of their economic lives?   
• What are the best options to replace the capacity that coal-fired power stations provide 
at times of peak demand, and to replace the energy that they provide throughout the 
year?   
Wind and solar power have very low operating costs and this tends to depress wholesale 
electricity prices. While such downward pressure is generally welcome, it makes it harder for 
older, less efficient and more costly coal-fired power stations to compete. This has contributed 
to the closure of ten power stations with about 5,000 MW of generating capacity, between 2012 
and 2017. This retirement of capacity has disrupted the electricity market, increased electricity 
prices and raised questions about the reliability of supply. Furthermore, these retirements have 
largely occurred with short notice, in the absence of a coordinated plan or related policy. In this 
context, Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) has raised the prospect of a shortfall in 
supply in the summer of 2017/18, following the closure of Hazelwood power station in Victoria 
earlier this year, and also in 2023/24 following the scheduled closure of the Liddell Power 
Station in NSW in 2022.  
The lessons of recent experience and the long advance notice period mean that the forthcoming 
closure of Liddell Power Station creates an unprecedented opportunity to effect a smoother 
transition, while minimising adverse impacts on electricity consumers, the environment and the 
local community.  
The Commonwealth Government has suggested that the preferred way to minimise the impact 
of the scheduled closure of Liddell is to defer the closure for at least five years.  On the other 
hand, AGL, the owner of Liddell Power Station, has flagged a potential alternative strategy to 
manage the transition through a mix of new generation, batteries and demand response. AGL 
requested that the Government allow their board 90 days to consider the options of keeping 
Liddell open for five years, selling the station, or maintaining AGL’s current strategy of 
scheduled closure of Liddell in 2022.  
The Australian Conservation Foundation commissioned the Institute for Sustainable Futures 
(ISF) at UTS to undertake this study Beyond Coal: Alternatives to Extending the Life of 
Liddell Power Station in order to inform this debate by investigating alternatives to the 
Commonwealth Government and AGL proposals. To this end, the study illustrates and 
compares three different primary scenarios: the extension of Liddell’s operations; AGL’s 
proposal and a “clean energy package” including renewable energy, energy efficiency, energy 
storage, demand response and flexible pricing. These choices are not only relevant for the case 
of Liddell, but also as an important precedent for the expected closure of the majority of 
Australia’s existing coal-fired power stations within the next two decades. 
Understanding the problem 
The first step in developing viable solutions is to describe the problem clearly. There are a 
number of elements to the challenge associated with the scheduled closure of Liddell, as 
summarised below: 
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1. Reliability: We need sufficient electricity supply capacity to meet expected demand. 
AEMO has identified that there could be shortfalls in electricity supply in the order of 
1000 MW by the summer of 2022/23 when Liddell closes.  AEMO indicates that there 
could be one or more such shortfalls lasting up to six hours at a time. (Note however 
that AEMO does not forecast a breach of the Reliability Standard.)  
2. Prices and bills: In the wake of the closure of Hazelwood and nine other power stations 
since 2012 and the lack of planning to ensure appropriate replacements, the gap 
between demand and supply has tightened, contributing to, amongst other things, a rise 
in electricity prices. Simply providing additional capacity for a few hours of peak demand 
per year is unlikely to reduce electricity prices significantly. For this reason, it is critical 
that any strategy to replace Liddell provides equivalent peak capacity (about 1,000 MW) 
and energy output (about 8,000 GWh per year).  
3. Longer term transition: Ten coal power stations have closed in the past five years. 
Liddell is the first of a further nine large power stations, representing as much as 60 per 
cent of Australia’s coal generating capacity, that are expected to reach the end of their 
economic lives within 15 years. Therefore, in responding to the impending closure of 
Liddell, it is crucial that we consider solutions that could provide a useful precedent for 
the much bigger transition that is soon to come.  
4. Climate action: Australia is a signatory to the Paris Agreement and has committed to 
take action on climate change to support global efforts to limit global warming to well 
below 2 degrees, aiming for 1.5 degrees. The electricity sector is responsible for about 
33 per cent of our emissions, while Australia produces more greenhouse gas emissions 
per unit of electricity than almost any other developed country. Cutting emissions from 
coal-fired power stations is crucial to achieving deep cuts in carbon emissions.  
 
A range of solutions  
There are many potential options to provide additional electricity capacity and energy in 2023.  
For simplicity, we have focussed on ten technology options, including extending the life of 
Liddell Power Station and a range of generation (supply side) and energy management 
(demand-side) options. These options include a range of the most prominent and practical 
options.   
These options were then aggregated into the following three primary scenarios:  
• Extend Liddell (refurbishing Liddell Power station to provide 1,000 MW of coal-fired 
electricity) 
• AGL Proposal, as outlined by AGL at their 2017 Annual General Meeting (comprising a 
100 MW of capacity upgrade at the Bayswater coal power station, 750 MW of gas 
power, 50 MW of wind, 100 MW of demand response and 50 MW of batteries)  
• Clean Energy package (comprising a mix of 1000 MW of energy efficiency, 600 MW of 
new wind energy generation, 250 MW of demand response and 200 MW of flexible 
pricing). 
The modelling considered the cost and carbon emissions over five years (2022-2027), in two 
cases:  
• a capacity-only case, which only sought to replace 1,000 MW of firm capacity of Liddell 
for six-hour peak demand events, up to four times per year  
• a capacity and energy case, which sought to replace both Liddell’s 1,000 MW of firm 
peak capacity, and its 8,000 GWh per annum of energy output. 
The capacity-only case addresses only the reliability challenge, while the capacity and energy 
case addresses all four challenges: reliability, prices and bills, longer-term transition and climate 
action. The capacity and energy case is therefore the more relevant case.  
The results of the capacity and energy case are summarised in Figure1. 
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Figure 1: Cost and carbon emissions comparisons across scenarios 
 
Source: ISF Modelling 
As illustrated in Figure 1, our modelling found that the Clean Energy Package would save more 
than $1.3 billion compared to the Extend Liddell scenario and more than $1 billion compared to 
the AGL Proposal. The total cost (including capital and operating costs) for five years is 
estimated at $2.2 billion for the Clean Energy Package, compared to $3.6 billion for the Extend 
Liddell proposal and $3.3 billion for the AGL Proposal. Furthermore, the Clean Energy package 
would have zero carbon emissions compared to 40 million tonnes of carbon dioxide over five 
years in the case of the Extend Liddell proposal and 2.5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide for the 
AGL scenario. The above costs do not include any value for carbon pollution. Including the cost 
of carbon emissions would further add to the cost of the Extend Liddell and the AGL Proposal 
scenarios, as shown in Figure 2. 
The above three primary scenarios were complemented by two additional scenarios: 
• Expanded Clean Energy package (This includes all of the Clean Energy Package plus 
an additional 100 MW of solar thermal, 100 MW of batteries and 50 MW of bioenergy) 
• Energy Efficiency Only (This comprises 1,200 MW of end use energy efficiency 
improvement only.) 
In the Expanded Clean Energy package, some of the cost savings from the primary Clean 
Energy Package (relative to the Extend Liddell scenario) are redirected to support local and 
regional economic transition and renewal in the form of employment and investment support. In 
addition to the Clean Energy technology options, this scenario includes providing 100 MW of 
batteries to customers in the Hunter region, 50 MW of bioenergy generation based at the Liddell 
site and 100 MW solar thermal with storage (although this last option is unlikely to be located at 
the Liddell site).  Even with this substantial additional cost over five years of about $880 million, 
this Expanded Clean Energy package is estimated to be about $400 million less expensive than 
the Liddell Extension scenario.  
The Energy Efficiency Only scenario replaces the wind energy, demand response and time 
varying pricing of the Clean Energy scenario with a further 300 MW firm capacity of energy 
efficiency improvement. This scenario is about $347 million or 15% cheaper than the primary 
Clean Energy scenario. 
These two additional scenarios for the capacity and energy case are shown in Figure 2, 
alongside the primary scenarios. Figure 2 also illustrates the cost impact of associated carbon 
emissions, based on a modest carbon price of $10/tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent. Note that 
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the carbon value does not impact on the cost of the clean energy or energy efficiency scenarios 
as they have zero emission. This carbon value is a “carbon price” applied to reflect the 
environmental cost of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere.   
However, the Expanded Clean Energy scenario also contributes by offsetting an extra 6.2 
million tonnes of carbon dioxide over five years due to an additional 1,200 GWh per annum of 
energy generation over and above the 8,000 GWh per annum required to replace the output of 
Liddell Power Station. 
Figure 2: Cost and emissions comparisons – primary and additional scenarios 
 
Source: ISF Modelling 
Conclusions 
There are a number of key implications that can be drawn from this study. 
1. Liddell Power Station was commissioned in the early 1970s and is nearing its end of 
design life. Despite significant maintenance and refurbishment, the reliability of the plant 
has significantly reduced over recent years with major unplanned outages during the 
February 2017 peak.  
2. In the context of other recent coal power station closures and future expected closures, 
there are legitimate concerns about the closure of Liddell Power Station, particularly 
relating to maintaining overall supply-demand balance and system security. These 
concerns demand a considered strategic response, as the proportion of coal-fired 
generation declines and the proportion of variable output renewable energy rises. 
3. The response to the proposed closure of Liddell Power Station should be linked to clear 
policy objectives around reliability, affordability, sustainability and minimising economic 
shocks for the local community and the nation.  
4. Based on these policy objectives, extending the life of Liddell Power Station would 
represent a poor outcome for energy consumers and the community. Choosing this 
option would be relatively expensive, potentially risky and much more polluting and it 
would do little to smooth the economic transition. 
5. As Liddell Power Station and its owner, AGL, are operating in a competitive electricity 
market, the Commonwealth government should adopt competitively neutral policies that 
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treat all market participants fairly. Singling out one company to respond would not 
provide an effective government policy and framework to transition the whole electricity 
sector.  
6. The existing AGL Proposal is likely to provide a lower cost, cleaner and more reliable 
outcome that extending the life of Liddell. 
7. The Clean Energy Package is likely to be much cheaper and cleaner and no less 
reliable than either the Extend Liddell or AGL Proposal.  
8. Some of the lowest cost options for replacing the capacity and energy of Liddell Power 
Station are beyond the control of AGL and require government policy setting. For 
example, energy efficiency, demand response and time varying pricing all require 
effective government policy to ensure they have a fair opportunity to compete, and 
provide least-cost outcomes. 
9. There are viable technologies and policies available to facilitate a smooth, low cost and 
reliable transition that supports the local economy and community and helps to reduce 
carbon emissions.  If such technologies and policies are adopted in the case of the 
Liddell Power Station closure, this would provide an invaluable precedent for 
successfully managing the longer-term energy transition.  
10. Drawing on this study, further detailed analysis and consultation is urgently required to 
develop practical clean energy alternatives to extending the life of Liddell Power Station. 
This analysis and consultation should include: 
• Thorough and balanced assessment of the potential and cost of all available 
options to provide both peak capacity and energy. This should include all relevant 
supply-side and demand-side options. 
• Developing detailed policies and programs to drive energy efficiency and time 
varying pricing in the context of the future energy market. (These options were 
largely neglected in the recent Finkel Review.)  
• Developing detailed policies and programs to support local economic transition for 
communities around those coal-fired power stations that are expected to close over 
the next 15 years. 
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1 Introduction 
In order to contribute to the national debate on energy security, affordability and the need for 
emission reduction, the Australian Conservation Foundation asked the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures to examine alternatives to extending the life of a ‘to-be-closed’ coal-fired power station. 
The aim of this study is to investigate the costs and availability of clean energy options that 
could substitute the capacity and output of Liddell Power Station after 2022. To this purpose, 
the study illustrates and compares different scenarios: the five-year extension of Liddell Power 
Station, AGL’s proposal, and a clean energy package including renewables, energy efficiency, 
demand response and flexible pricing. The modelling covers the cost and carbon emissions 
over a five-year period in two scenarios: a capacity-only scenario and a capacity and energy 
scenario. The key consideration in the capacity-only case is reliability of the system for meeting 
peak demand, as this capacity could be constrained after the closure of Liddell Power Station. 
Hence, this scenario addresses a potential shortfall of about 1,000 MW capacity and offers a 
comparison of costs and emissions for three alternative scenarios. 
The focus of the capacity and energy case is, in addition to the above, the affordability of the 
transition in the medium to longer term. The recent closure of Hazelwood, Northern and other 
coal-fired power stations has led to a “tightening” between overall supply capacity and demand 
in the national electricity market. This has in turn led to significant recent rises in electricity 
prices.  Simply providing short-term capacity would do little to relieve these price pressures.  
Moreover, if the output of more coal-fired power stations is removed over the next decade or 
two and not replaced, then electricity shortfalls will occur not just during peak periods, but 
throughout the year. Therefore, to address both the reliability challenge and affordability 
challenge, we took into account replacing both Liddell’s 1000 MW of capacity and its 8,000 
GWh per annum of energy output.  
This report starts with an outline of the challenge described by the Australian Energy Market 
Operator (AEMO) in their Electricity Statement of Opportunities in September 2017, which 
includes the general profile of, and background to, the closure of Liddell Power Station. It then 
discusses possible scenarios, firstly by presenting an overview of ten technology options, 
secondly by introducing the three scenarios, and thirdly by comparing the different options. The 
last chapter provides insights into implications and opportunities for workers and the local 
community in the Hunter region. It also reflects on the future development of electricity prices in 
the light of the three scenarios and offers broad policy recommendations. The report concludes 
with recommendations for further research. 
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2 What is the problem?    
Liddell Power Station is located in the Hunter region, a hub of various industries, including black 
coal mining, electricity generation, manufacturing, agriculture and viticulture. In April 2015, AGL 
announced that the power plant would be closed in 2022 and tabled a proposal to replace 
Liddell’s capacity with a combination of gas, wind and solar power. In the context of AEMO’s 
recent 10-year forecast on the electricity supply in NSW, this announcement has been called 
into question by the Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Minister for the Environment and 
Energy Josh Frydenberg (MacDonald-Smith and Potter, 2017). The Prime Minister announced 
that the Commonwealth Government is trying to delay the closure of Liddell for at least five 
years (Yaxley and Lowery, 2017) . 
Figure 3: The Hunter Region in context of the state of New South Wales 
 
Source: State Records, NSW Government. 
Yet, simply extending the life of Liddell Power Station will not solve the problem. In fact, there 
are four dimensions associated with scheduled closure of Liddell that need to be addressed:  
1. Reliability: We need sufficient electricity supply capacity to meet expected demand. 
AEMO has identified that there could be shortfalls in electricity supply of the order of 
1000 MW by the summer of 2022/23 when Liddell closes. AEMO indicates that there 
could be one or more of these shortfalls lasting up to six hours at a time. 
2. Prices and bills – affordability: In the wake of the closure of Hazelwood and nine other 
power plants since 2012, coupled with the lack of appropriate planning, the gap 
between demand and supply has tightened and it this has been a contributing factor to 
electricity prices rises (ACCC, 2017). Simply providing additional capacity for a few 
hours of peak demand per year is unlikely to significantly reduce electricity prices.  For 
this reason, it is critical that any strategy to replace Liddell provides equivalent peak 
capacity (about 1,000 MW) and energy output (about 8,000 GWh per year).  
3. The longer-term transition for replacing aging coal power stations: Ten coal power 
stations have closed in the past five years. Liddell is the first of a further nine large 
power stations, representing as much as 60 per cent of Australia’s coal generating 
capacity, that are expected to reach the end of their economic lives within 15 years. 
Therefore, in developing solutions to address Liddell, it is crucial that we consider 
solutions that could provide a useful precedent for the much bigger transition that is 
soon to come.  
4. Climate action: Australia is a signatory to the Paris Agreement and has committed to 
take action on climate change to support global efforts to limit global warming to well 
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below 2 degrees, aiming for 1.5 degrees. The electricity sector is responsible for about 
33 per cent of our emissions, while Australia produces more greenhouse gas emissions 
per unit of electricity than almost any other developed country. Cutting emissions from 
coal-fired power stations is crucial to achieving deep cuts in carbon emissions. Further, 
the Paris Agreement requires that emission reduction commitments to be reviewed 
every five years with the expectation that they will be increased.  
2.1 AEMO’s reliability challenge  
On 5 September 2017, AEMO published the Electricity Statement of Opportunities (ESOO) 
which provides a 10-year outlook for the supply-demand balance of the NEM. Their analysis 
indicates that the potential for unserved energy (USE) in NSW and Victoria remains within the 
current Australian Reliability Standard until 2027.1 This means, that their modelling confirms 
adequate supply in both states even after Liddell Power Station closes (AEMO, 2017a). 
However, AEMO identifies two big threats. Firstly, there is a medium- to longer-term risk 
associated with the retirement of the coal-fired power station in NSW. The likelihood of any 
unserved energy in 2024/25 ranges between 29 per cent and 46 per cent in NSW, and such an 
event could last from two to six hours. Since demand is expected to increase in 2024 as the net 
effect of solar PV plateaus2, AEMO indicates that 1,010MW of additional dispatchable 
resources would be required in 2024-25 in NSW and Victoria to reduce the risk of any unserved 
energy to a one in 10-year probability after the closure of Liddell. Secondly, their modelling 
indicates that in the event of another large coal-fired power station3 retiring in 2022-23 ‘there is 
a significant risk of a low reserve condition (LRC)’ (AEMO, 2017e). Hence, the likelihood of a 
need for load shedding across the state could increase if no additional firm capacity or demand 
response measures are established. AEMO emphasises that the likelihood of additional thermal 
capacity exiting the market earlier becomes more likely will increase due to an increase in 
competition, which could reduce generator profitability. These competitive influences come from 
declining demand due to an increase in the use of rooftop solar PV and energy efficiency with 
more low cost renewables, and will be compounded by the aging generation fleet, higher 
temperatures and complex challenges faced by generators in managing their fuel supplies due 
to tighter gas markets, coal quality issues and water management strategies. In addition, there 
is a risk associated with the unavailability of large thermal units during the hot summer months, 
as was experienced in February 2017. A number of factors, including the tripping of Liddell and 
Vales Point in NSW, made load shedding of the Tomago smelter necessary to maintain overall 
supply-demand balance and system security (Australian Energy Regulator, 2017) .  
In AEMO’s ESOO modelling, the projected unserved energy would exceed the reliability 
standard in South Australia (SA) and Victoria under a high demand scenario for summer 
2017/18 (see Figure 4). This is backed up by the mid-term projected assessment of system 
adequacy (MTPASA)4 which indicated there was a risk of low reserve conditions. AEMO and 
the SA government have taken action to secure a reserve via the Reliability and Emergency 
                                                     
 
1 According to AEMO, unserved energy is the amount of energy that cannot be supplied to consumers, resulting in involuntary 
load shedding (loss of customer supply), because there is insufficient generation capacity, demand site participation, or network 
capability, to meet demand. The NEM Reliability Standard requires that projected unserved energy should not exceed 0.002% 
in any region. 
2 AEMO predicts operational demand will remain flat until 2023/24 as rooftop PV offsets projected increases in appliances, 
cooling and population growth. AEMO predicts demand will then increase, with the time of maximum demand delayed until after 
sunset. NSW is expected to shift from a summer to a winter peak around 2026/27 as rooftop PV has a bigger offset during 
summer. 
3 Another candidate for closure is Vales Point Power Station (1,320 MW), which was built in 1978 and will be 44 years old in 
2022.  
4 AEMO uses the MTPASA as a deterministic model to identify potential low reserve conditions (LRC) for each region in the 
National Electricity Market. 
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Reserve Trader (RERT),5 a demand response program and the SA Energy Plan (AEMO, 
2017b).  
The range of USE outcomes over the period is linked to supply and demand and is summarised 
in Figure 4: 
Figure 4: Range of unserved energy outcomes  
 
Source: AEMO ESOO 2017, page 2. 
Consequently, AEMO warns that ‘we face an increasing and unacceptable risk that there will be 
insufficient capability in the system to meet NEM reliability standards’. They conclude that, with 
the increase in variable renewable resources, the current market design does not provide 
adequate and sustained signals to the market to incentivise the development of new flexible 
dispatchable resources at the level required to maintain system reliability over the medium to 
long term (AEMO, 2017b). In fact, AEMO highlights the opportunities of dispatchable resources 
to provide reliable supply which can include generation on the grid, storage, demand resources 
behind the meter, flexible demand, or flexible network capability(AEMO, 2017e).  
2.2 The Energy trilemma: reliability, affordability & sustainability  
In reference to AEMO’s Electricity Statement of Opportunities in September 2017, the prime 
minister raised his concerns about security and affordability of supply in the summer of 2017/18 
and the subsequent challenges in 2022. He stated to that: “The report also warns that, on top of 
the immediate risk, there will be more pressure in 2022, when the Liddell Power Station is due 
to close. The energy minister and I are already in discussions with the owner of Liddell, AGL, 
about how we can ensure that that power station stays in operation for at least another five 
years after 2022.” (House of Representatives, 2017)  
                                                     
 
5 The Reliability and Emergency Reserve Trader (RERT) is a function conferred on AEMO to maintain power system reliability 
and system security using reserve contract. AEMO is seeking offers of additional reserves for summer 2017–18 through the 
RERT provisions. The RERT allows AEMO to procure additional generation or DSP capacity not normally available to the 
market, to maintain the reliability or security of the power system. 
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However, AEMO does not indicate that there is a specific need to extend the life of existing 
coal-fired power stations, or to build new ones beyond 2022. Indeed, AEMO state that the 
biggest risk for USE is projected for this summer of 2017/18.  
Despite an expectation that the reliability standard will be met in the NEM over the forecast 
period, risk assessments demonstrate the continued risk of supply shortfalls if generator 
availability is lower than expected, or if extreme summer conditions prevail in this period (up 
until 2027) (AEMO, 2017f). This expectation that the reliability standard will be met in the short 
term is also backed by declining future energy prices out to 2021 (see Figure 5). Reliability is 
still challenged during peak demand events, and the risk of unserved energy increases if wind 
and photovoltaic (PV) generation drops to low levels, other generation stops unexpectedly, or 
electricity flow between regions is constrained. Additionally, we still face a reliability challenge 
for capacity and energy in the long term if adequate measures are not taken in the next few 
years. 
Figure 5: NEM quarterly base futures prices 
 
Source: AER, 2017 
 
Since wind and solar have very low operating costs, these technologies tend to depress 
wholesale electricity prices. This can make it harder for older, less efficient and more costly 
power stations to compete. Because solar has variable output, it gives rise to challenging 
“ramping” issues for conventional generation as illustrated in the now famous ‘duck curve’ (see  
Figure 6). Due to the strong growth in rooftop solar installations, AEMO expects that demand on 
the grid in the middle of the day will fall further, resulting in a rapid increase in demand in the 
lead-up to the evening peak as the sun sets (AEMO, 2017h). This highlights the need for 
substantial load shifting, demand response, energy storage and/or flexible generation to ramp 
up and down output in a short amount of time. As older coal fired power stations close, the gap 
between supply and demand tightens and wholesale prices rise. 
Thus, the affordability challenge has both capacity and energy concerns in the short, medium 
and long term.  
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Figure 6: The “Duck Curve” in South Australia6 
Source: AEMO. (2017). Visibility of Distributed Energy Resources. page 12. 
 
The impacts been evident in the last five years when ten coal fired power stations closed in 
Australia (see Table 1). Hence, as coal fired power stations are pushed out of the market we 
need affordable alternatives that help to manage peak demand times during hot summer or cold 
winter months and to provide flexibility to complement variable output solar and wind power 
Table 1: Australia's decommissioned coal-fired power stations 










NSW Munmorah Black coal  1969 2012 43 600 None 
NSW Redbank Black coal 2001 2014 13 144 None 
NSW Wallerawang C Black coal 1976-80 2014 38 1,000 4 months 
VIC Morwell Black coal 1958-62 2014 52-56 189 n/a 
VIC Hazelwood Brown coal 1964 2017 53 1,600 5 months 
VIC Anglesea Black coal 1969 2015 46 160 3 ½  months  
QLD Collinsville Black coal 1998 2012 14 180 6 months 
QLD Swanbank B Black coal 1970-73 2012 42 500 n/a 
SA Northern  Brown coal 1985 2016 31 546 11 months 
SA Playford  Brown coal 1960 2016 56 240 4 months 
Source: Australian Energy Council 2017. 
                                                     
 
6 Daily demand for grid electricity in South Australia. 
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Another factor that is widely regarded as contributing to the capacity problem was the 
investment uncertainty caused by the reviews of the RET which resulted in deferred investment 
in new renewable energy projects.  
Furthermore, delaying Liddell’s termination will compound the problem of other coal-fired power 
stations closures. This effect is illustrated in Figure 7, which highlights that suspending Liddell’s 
termination would result in up to nine coal-fired power stations reaching retirement age in a 
seven-year window starting in 2028. It should be also noted that the closures are based on the 
economic and technical design life of the power plants. However, national climate change 
commitments could also impact the schedule for closing coal-fired power stations before 2030.  
 
Figure 7: Potential future coal-fired capacity losses 
 
Source: Investor Group on Climate Change, 2017, p. 9. 
Another issue is the reliability of coal-fired power stations. AGL emphasises that Liddell’s 
reliability has decreased over the last few years and Liddell is expected to experience more 
unanticipated outages as it approaches its end of life (AGL Energy Limited, 2017a). In fact, 
Parkinson (2017a) reported that Liddell’s capacity factor was just 38.2 per cent in September 
2017 while the plant operated at about 50 per cent through 2016/17 (see also Figure 8). While 
the age of the plant is a crucial factor for its reliability, it was found that heat waves can trigger 
outages of coal and gas-fired power plants. The events in February 2017 are evidence of this. 
At this time, NSW experienced forced outages of thermal generation of more than 1,000 MW 
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Figure 8: Liddell median output July 2015 to July 2017 
 
Source: NEM review 2017 
Currently committed and proposed wind and solar projects are sufficient to replace the energy 
output of the coal power stations that are expected to close over the next decade (see Table 2). 
There is also potential for much more wind and solar energy to be developed over this period.  
Table 2: Proposed renewable energy generation in the NEM 
Status  NSW NEM 
Wind Solar* Wind Solar* Total 
Existing (MW)                665              254             4,070                 274  4,344 
Committed (MW)                173              145                690                 692  1,082 
Proposed (MW)             4,466              837           11,938              6,975  19.995 
Total (MW)             5,303           1,236           16,698              7,941  24,682 
Potential output of 
proposed  & 
committed (GWh/y)** 
          13,408           1,377           36,505            10,746  47,251 
*Excluding Rooftop solar 
** Calculated based on assumptions: 33% capacity factor for wind; 16% capacity factor for solar  
Source: (AEMO, 2017d) 
 
However, this energy output must be complemented with adequate firm peak capacity on the 
supply side and demand side in order to maintain reliability and affordability. By combining new 
renewable capacity with demand response, time varying prices, storage firming capacity and 
energy efficiency, Australia can have more than adequate energy resources to cope with the 




November 2017   20 
3 Technology options  
This section describes the technology options that we have analysed, and outlines the 
assumptions that have been made in estimating their cost, and their contribution to firm capacity 
and energy supply. Section 4 then describes the scenarios, or packages of technology options, 
that have been developed to meet the specified needs for capacity and for capacity plus energy. 
Finally, the results of the analysis for the two outcomes (capacity, and capacity plus energy) for 
each of the scenarios are presented and compared. 
A range of technology options, from 3.1 to 3.11 are described below, including the background, 
description and key assumptions for each one. 
3.1 Extending Liddell (coal) 
The Liddell Power Station is located in the upper Hunter Valley and was commissioned in 1972. 
After the closure of Hazelwood Power Station in March 2017, it became Australia’s oldest 
operating large coal-fired power station. AGL acquired the assets of Liddell from the NSW 
Government in 2014, at an effective price of zero dollars (AGL Energy Limited, 2014).  
As part of AGL’s Greenhouse Gas Policy, the company announced at its Annual General 
Meeting in 2015 its intention to close Liddell Power Station at the end of its expected operating 
life in 2022 (AGL Energy Limited, 2017b). However, in September 2017 the Commonwealth 
Government announced that it had started to negotiate with AGL about extending the life of the 
power station in order to maintain what they believe is critical baseload power during the 
transition to a low carbon economy (AFR, 2017). Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and the 
Minister for the Environment and Energy Josh Frydenberg have expressed their desire for the 
power station to stay in operation for at least another five years after 2022 (House of 
Representatives, 2017). 
Several estimates of the necessary costs for refurbishment needed to extend the life Liddell are 
circulating in the media. The capital costs used in this report are based on the desktop research 
commissioned by Liddell’s then owner, the NSW Government’s Macquarie Generation, in 2013. 
WorleyParsons Consulting assessed that the cost of extending its life by ten years would 
amount to $980 million (WorleyParsons Consulting, 2013).  
Other sources such as the Finkel Review (2017) estimated that the cost of the refurbishment 
needed to extend the generator’s life for another 10 years would be between $600 million and 
$700 million. However, experience with other aging coal power plants such as the Muja Power 
Station in Western Australia has shown that the refurbishment can be more difficult than 
anticipated. The costs and timeframe for the Muja plant 200km south of Perth ultimately 
doubled from the initial estimate of $150 million to beyond $300 million, and the project was 
subject to numerous operational problems. Since its refurbishment the plant was running for 
only 20 per cent of the time and its closure has been announced for next year (Morton, 2017).  
The cost of finance to extend the life of Liddell is also likely to be higher. The weighted average 
cost of capital7 for coal is projected to be 14.9%, compared to 7.1% for renewables (Gerardi and 
Galanis, 2017) . 
                                                     
 
7 The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the rate that a company is expected to pay on average to all its security 
holders to finance its assets. The WACC is commonly referred to as the firm's cost of capital. 
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Liddell operated in 2016 at an equivalent availability factor8 of 53 per cent (AGL Energy Limited, 
2016b). This figure has also been used in this modelling, however estimates and statements by 
AGL representatives suggest a much lower percentage of energy available (Parkinson, 2017b).  
The fuel costs in our scenario are based on data from AGL (2016a) which indicate $60/MWh as 
the NEM-wide costs of coal in 2016 (Figure 9). These costs are conservative and are expected 
to rise in the following years.  
Figure 9: Black coal costs in the NEM (AUD/ MWh sent out) 
 
Source: AGL Investor Day 2016, slide 8. 
Furthermore, AGL’s contracted coal stockpiles have declined since 2015 and are expected to 
further decrease until 2019. In 2015 and 2016 the contracted coal volumes were less than 
requirements, suggesting that spot market buying was necessary (see Figure 10). This trend 
suggests that AGL’s coal under a purchase contract (at the old price) will further drop and 
hence Liddell will be exposed to increasing fuel prices. The developments in the coal market 
suggest that in 2022 the costs for contracted coal could be 10 to 20 per cent higher than today 
(Leitch, 2017). 
Figure 10: AGL’s black coal under a purchase contract 2015 to 2019 
 
Source: AGL Investor Day 2016, slide 7. 
                                                     
 
8 The equivalent availability factor is a standard industry performance indicator. It measure the proportion of a given operating 
period in which a generating unit is available without any outages.  
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Beyond the costs for refurbishment and operation, keeping the plant running longer will result in 
additional emissions, both in carbon dioxide and local air pollutants. Coal-fired power plants are 
the major contributor to the energy sector’s carbon emissions. We have used the figure from 
AGL’s 2016 Sustainability Report, which stated that the carbon intensity of Liddell is 1.01 
tCO2e/MWh (AGL Energy Limited, 2016a). The plant emitted around 7.7 million tonnes of 
carbon dioxide in FY 2016 (AGL Energy Limited, 2016c). The local air pollution can be a serious 
problem. Pollution from mines such as Bulga in the Hunter Valley has increased 32 per cent in 
the past year. Air quality studies indicate that power station sulphur dioxide emissions cause 
between 10 and 40 per cent of annual average particulate air pollution in the Sydney, Lower 
Hunter and Upper Hunter regions. For the area in and around the cities of Sydney, Wollongong 
and Newcastle, coal-fired power plants contributed 87 per cent of the area's 187,000 tonnes of 
sulphur dioxide pollution and more than a third of the 724 kilograms of mercury registered over 
2016 (Hannam, 2017). 
3.2 Gas-fired peaking plant 
AGL proposes to replace Liddell’s capacity by focusing on gas technology. According to AGL, 
its gas project would use reciprocating engine technology similar to that used in its Barker Inlet 
Power Station in South Australia (AGL Energy Limited, 2017b). Our modelling is based on the 
investment estimate for Barker Inlet of $295 million for 210 MW, which would amount to $1,404 
per kW. While reciprocating engines have lower capital and operating costs than combined 
cycle power plants (CCGT)9 or Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT)10 technologies, the efficiency 
is lower and the emission intensity is higher, and the economic lifetime of the systems is less. 
The lifetime of the engine is 15 years, based on the GE report for 10 MW reciprocating engines 
(General Electric Company, 2016). We note that the lifespan of the engines depends on the 
number of cycles of use. Hence, if the gas plant were only to be used as peaker replacement, it 
could run for a longer time. Based on this we have used 20 years as the lifetime.    
For our emissions intensity estimate we used the figures provided by AEMO in their 2016 
Planning Study. The emission rate for OCGT technologies in northern New South Wales ranges 
between 0.465 and 0.520 tCO2 e/MWh. In our calculation, we used the average of 0.48 
tCO2e/MWh. We note that new gas power plants are less polluting than coal, but when one 
considers the entire supply chain, gas is not significantly less polluting (Climate Council, 2017).  
Figure 11: Indicative relative gas price impacts on generation fuel costs 
 
Source: Finkel et al. 2017, p. 111. 
                                                     
 
9 Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT) are a form of efficient energy generation technology that combines a gas-fired turbine 
with a steam turbine. 
10 An open cycle gas turbine (OCGT) is a combustion turbine plant fired by liquid fuel to turn a generator rotor that produces 
electricity. 
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A major cost driver for gas technologies is the fuel cost. In recent years, gas prices have 
increased significantly and contributed to a decline in gas-fired electricity generation (see Figure 
11). These higher gas prices have been attributed to a number of factors: increased exports, 
linkage to international oil prices, diversion of gas reserves to meet export contracts, market 
responses to shortages and reliance on gas power to meet demand. In addition, gentailers11 
have used their market power to push up the gas price on the spot market, particularly in South 
Australia in June 2016 (Climate Council, 2017). We note that domestic gas prices will likely be 
higher in the future compared with historical levels (Finkel et al., 2017). It is estimated that the 
fuel cost of generating electricity at a gas price of $9/GJ is in the range of $60/MWh to 
$140/MWh (Figure 11 and Figure 12) depending on the efficiency of the plant. We used the 
average value of $100/ MWh since no change for medium-term gas prices is expected due to 
the abovementioned factors. 
Figure 12: Domestic gas market price 
 
Source: AEMO 2017. 
3.3 Pumped hydro (Snowy 2.0 upgrade) 
The current energy storage markets, both domestically and internationally, are dominated not 
by batteries but by pumped hydro, which is a mature technology (IRENA, 2012). Pumped hydro 
currently constitutes 97 per cent of worldwide electricity storage, but is neglected in many 
analyses (Blakers, Lu and Stocks, 2017). Australia has three large-scale pumped hydro facilities 
operating which contribute 1,340 MW to the NEM. They are: Tumut 3 in the Snowy Mountains 
with 600 MW, Shoalhaven in southern NSW with 240 MW, and Wivenhoe in southern QLD with 
500 MW.  
In combination with renewable energy generation, pumped hydro storage is considered 
beneficial for storing surplus energy when energy production exceeds demand and then 
providing power back to the market at times of peak demand or capacity constraint. It has to be 
noted that approximately 80% of Australia’s grid electricity is generated using fossil fuels, and 
that most pumped hydro facilities in Australia still use grid electricity to transport their water from 
the bottom to the top of the hill. Hence, pumped hydro capacities cannot be considered to be 
clean energy as long as they are powered by a fossil fuel-based grid.  
The Commonwealth Government is proposing the Snowy 2.0 upgrade as the ‘solution to the 
national energy crisis’ (Ludlow, 2017). The project, announced in March 2017, would be 
expected to add another 2,000 MW of electricity, or about 350,000 megawatt hours (350 GWh) 
of energy storage, to the existing pumped hydro scheme. It could run non-stop for seven days. 
                                                     
 
11 Gentailer is a portmanteau word combining generator and retailer, i.e. generator-retailer. It refers to the vertical integration of 
companies operating in the NEM, where generators own a retail arm. 
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The plan involves creating generation and pumping capacity, and connecting two reservoirs 
with an underground tunnel. It is expected that only a small amount of net additional water will 
be used (Snowy Hydro Limited, 2017a). The capital costs of the project are estimated at $2 
billion, plus an additional estimated $2 billion to be spent on upgrading transmission lines 
(Ludlow, 2017). Our model is based on these cost estimates, including network costs, which 
translates to $2,136 per kW of firm capacity (considering a capacity firmness of 93.6 per cent). 
However, we note that a feasibility study for Snowy 2.0 is still underway and no detailed data 
have been disclosed yet (Snowy Hydro Limited, 2017b).  
Although some critics have stated that the planned extension would be ‘diabolically difficult to 
deliver’ and might take longer than anticipated (Gribbin, 2017), the potential for pumped hydro 
in Australia has been recognised recently. A study by ANU investigated off-river reservoirs 
located at the top of hills and identified more than 22,000 suitable sites for pumped hydro 
across the country (Blakers et al., 2017). The ARENA co-funded study found that New South 
Wales has 200 times more pumped hydro resources than that required to decarbonise the 
electricity supply, and many of the potential sites in NSW have good co-location with 
infrastructure, such as transmission lines, and are also located within renewable energy hubs. 
Some 8,600 sites with a total capacity of 29,000 GWh were identified across NSW (ANU, 2017) 
(see Figure 13). 
Figure 13: Potential of pumped hydro in the north-west NSW 
 
Source: ANU. New South Wales PHES atlas. 2017 
Indeed, beyond Snowy 2.0, a number of other projects were announced recently. These include 
the Oven Mountain Pumped Storage between Armidale and Kempsey in NSW, Kidston in North 
Queensland, the expansion of Hydro Tasmania and the Cultana Pumped Hydro Project in 
South Australia. However, the estimated costs of these projects vary significantly depending on 
the location and works required (Hearps, Dargaville and Mcconnell, 2014). The Melbourne 
Energy Institute found that internationally, the costs for pumped hydro can be as low as $600/ 
kW (see Figure 14).  
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Figure 14: Comparison of estimated capital costs per unit of electricity capacity ($/kW) 
 
Source: Hearps et al. (2016) from Melbourne Energy Institute 
Capital cost estimates for specific Australian examples range from the lower end of $1,100/kW 
(Blakers, 2015) and $1200/kW (Genex Power Limited, 2017), to the middle range of $1,600/kW 
(Oven Mountain Pumped Storage, 2017) up to the higher end with $2,100/kW for Cultana’s 
SeaWater pumped hydro (EnergyAustralia, Arup and Melbourne Energy Institute, 2017).  
Advantages of pumped hydro in combination with renewable energy generation are: delivering 
electricity as a highly dispatchable and renewable energy source that can deliver firm capacity 
much cheaper than wind energy alone. However, we need to ensure that all relevant options 
are considered in order to procure the most cost effective flexible capacity such as demand 
response, battery storage and time varying prices. 
While pumped hydro does not generate emissions directly, it is not necessarily emissions free, 
when emissions associated with pumping water uphill are considered. The efficiency losses are 
estimated at 42 per cent based on experience with existing plants (ACIL Allen Consulting, 
2014). As this energy is an additional consumption, it is likely to be driven by coal and gas-fired 
generation. On this basis, the emissions are estimated at 0.29 tCO2/ MWh.  
In any case, Snowy 2.0 cannot be considered as a viable replacement for Liddell because: 
• It only provides capacity and no additional energy. 
• It is more polluting than other forms of capacity. 
• It is unlikely to be available by 2022.  
• It is likely to be more expensive that other forms of capacity. 
3.4 Wind energy  
Wind energy is a mature technology and one of the mainstreamed renewable energy sources of 
electricity generation. Based on levelised cost of energy (LCE), wind energy is now one of the 
lowest-cost forms of centralised generation (see Figure 19 and Figure 20). In fact, the capital 
costs of wind energy have come down significantly in the last two decades (see Figure 15).   
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Figure 15: Wind farm costs over time 
 
Source: Rutovitz et al., 2016, p. 4 
In this analysis, we have used $2,047per kW of installed capacity for new wind farms. This 
figure reflects the capacity-weighted average for eight recent wind farms, based on the 
published costs (see Table 4).  
As with any other generation source, not all of the installed capacity of wind farms can be relied 
upon to be available at any given time, and in particular at time of peak demand. In other words, 
the “firm capacity” is less than the “installed capacity”. The “firm capacity factor” is the proportion 
of the installed wind capacity can be relied upon to be available at peak time.  AEMO’s estimate 
for the “firm capacity factor” for new wind farms, is 3 per cent for NSW  during summer, and 4.2 
per cent during winter (AEMO, 2016b). These estimates are based on AEMO's analysis of 
historical wind output over summers from 2011-12 to 2015-16, and winters from 2011 to 2015 
(AEMO, 2017g). AEMO states that due to ‘the intermittent nature of wind, wind generation 
capacities are de-rated to account for the output most likely to be available during times of 
maximum demand’. This means for every 100MW of new installed wind energy capacity, 3 MW 
can be relied upon to be available at the time of summer peak demand.   
Table 3: Expected wind contribution during peak demand (% of registered wind capacity) 
Minimum expected wind 




Victoria Tasmania New South 
Wales 
Five year summer average 9.4% 7.5% 8.5% 3.0% 
Five year winter average 7.0% 6.8% 4.9% 4.2% 
*Expressed as a percentage of registered capacity, with peak demand defined as the top 10% of demand 
periods 
Source: AEMO (2016b) p. 17.  
The relatively low firm capacity factor in NSW in part reflects the low penetration of wind energy 
in this state, which means that there is very little geographical diversity in wind generation 
output. We note that this NSW figure is very low compared to the average firm capacity factor 
used in other states and elsewhere in the world.  For example, OFGEM’s 2014 UK electricity 
capacity assessment examines different scenarios and estimates the equivalent firm capacity, 
which is needed to replace the entire wind fleet’s contribution at peak times. With wind power 
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factor for total installed wind capacity in the UK was estimated at between 15 per cent and 22 
per cent for. This is in a context where the average capacity factor in the UK over the last five 
years was 23 per cent, which is much lower than the average capacity factor of 33 per cent over 
the past six years in Australia (Rutovitz et al, 2016). 
Table 4: Published costs for wind farms in Australia in 2017 







Silverton 450 200 2,250 AGL media release dated 18 Jan 2017 
Coopers Gap 850 453 1,876 AGL media release dated 17 Aug 2017 
Mt Emerald 380 180 2,111 Mt Emerald Project webpage 
Mt Gellibrand 258 132 1,955 Mt Gellibrand Project webpage 
Kiata 75 30 2,500 Kiata media release dated 21 March 2017 
Crookwell 2 200 91 2,198 Media release dated 5 June 2017 
Bodangora 236 113 2,088 Infigen media release dated 31 March 2017 
Cattle Hill 300 144 2,083 Aurora media release dated 6 June 2017 
Total 2,749 1,343 2,047 Weighted average costs 
 
We note that for replacing peak capacity, wind energy is very expensive due to its low firm 
capacity factor. Yet, the technology’s advantages are that it is a very cheap and clean energy 
source, which has high potential as a low-cost option, which, in combination with other 
technologies, can provide firm capacity.  
3.5 Grid-scale battery storage 
Large-scale battery storage systems are practical alternatives to establishing a peaking gas 
turbine facility. Grid-scale battery storage systems can be designed to provide capacity and 
energy at peak times. They can be brought online quickly in order to meet a rapidly increasing 
demand and they can be taken offline when demand diminishes. Hence, this technology is a 
highly dispatchable energy source that can provide fast frequency response. In the last five 
years, the capital cost for battery storage has declined significantly, and industry experts 
anticipate further large cost reductions in the next five years. These projected cost reductions 
are attributed to scale and related cost savings, improved standardisation and technological 
improvements. These are in turn supported by an increase in demand. 
 
We assessed grid-scale storage as one option in our alternative clean energy scenario. For the 
modelling, we used data for lithium-ion batteries for a peaker replacement system from the 
Lazard’s Levelised Cost of Storage 3.0 analysis published in November 2017. To reflect the fast 
moving market, we used the middle range of capital cost with AUD$586 per kW/ year. 
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Figure 16: Unsubsidised Levelised cost of storage comparison – US$/kW-year  
 
Source: Lazard, 2017  
Despite a capacity firmness of 92 per cent (AEMO, 2016a), the capacity costs of grid-scale 
batteries are significant. While battery storage in combination with wind energy could be a clean 
energy source, firm capital costs would be $8,666 per kW. Therefore, 100 MW of battery 
storage would increase the costs of the clean energy scenario by 13 per cent. Hence, we 
excluded grid-scale storage from the Clean Energy scenarios.  
3.6 Distributed battery storage for existing solar  
In the Hunter region, 16% of the households have solar PV on their roof i.e. over 49,000 
households with the majority of systems under 10kW (Australian PV Institute, 2017). The cost 
declines in most battery storage technologies has opened new opportunities, in particular in 
combination with household solar. This combination has been well received by the Australian 
public. In order to harness the socio-economic benefits of distributed technologies, we have 
included the deployment of distributed battery storage in combination with existing solar PV 
systems in our Expanded Clean Energy scenario.  
We used the capital cost for residential battery storage from Tesla’s Powerwall 2.0 model with 
$5,500 per kW.12 The firmness capacity is assumed at 90 per cent (Origin Energy, 2017). Our 
data for the capacity factor and fixed O&M are based on Lazard’s report (Lazard, 2016).  
The potential advantages of energy storage systems behind-the-meter in residential homes are: 
the provision of emergency backup power, power quality improvements and the ability to store 
“free” surplus rooftop solar energy and reduce peak tariffs later in the day, enabling customers 
to further reduce their electricity costs. In addition, battery storage can regulate the power 
supply and smooths the quantity of electricity sold back to the grid from distributed solar 
applications.  However, the capital costs are still relatively high and the economic life (estimated 
10 years) is low in comparison to some other options. In addition, existing solar households will 
have to bear the additional costs of an inverter replacement or the installation of an additional 
inverter. While private households can, and do, install these systems, such adoption depends 
on individual decision making which does not optimise the location and use of the systems. 
                                                     
 
12 One 14 kWh Powerwall 2.0 battery costs a total of $11,000 including supporting hardware and equipment costs,  
November 2017   29 
There is a potential role for utilities or State or Commonwealth Government to incentivise more 
efficient uptake of distributed storage by, for example, rebates, peak demand focussed incentive 
payments or “on-bill financing”. 
3.7 Solar thermal with storage 
Concentrating solar thermal power plants (CSPs) concentrate the sun’s heat to create steam 
and drive a conventional steam turbine. The addition of relatively cheap molten salt storage 
allows the plants to be dispatchable and increases the capacity factor. Today, all new solar 
thermal power plants incorporate thermal storage. The technology is still at the early stages of 
the cost reduction path, driven by a sharp increase in installations over the last ten years, 
coupled with the emergence of molten salt storage and the improved tower design. While there 
are 4,800 MW of CSP installed worldwide, Australia has only just announced its first large-scale 
CSP plant at Port Augusta in South Australia (Premier of South Australia, 2017).  
The costs estimates in this study are derived from the Port Augusta project that will invest $650 
million for the 150 MW plant. The assumed firm capacity is taken from a report into the potential 
for CSP to reduce grid constraints. The report examined the potential operation of CSP plants 
with various levels of storage during critical peak events in the NEM for both winter and summer 
afternoons and evenings (Rutovitz et al., 2013). 
There is likely to be a cost penalty associated with the first few plants installed. However, the 
cost estimate used here is at the high end internationally to take this into account.  
Northern and inland NSW is suitable for installation of CSP plants.  Note that coastal conditions 
are not generally suitable because of the relatively high occurrence of cloudy conditions. Hence, 
we acknowledge that there are challenges associated with the required space for a solar 
thermal plant. For example, the planned solar thermal project in Port Augusta (150 MW) will 
feature about 12,000 billboard-sized mirrors measuring 100 sqm in a circle over an area of 
about 650ha (Beyond Zero Emissions, 2012). The site of the Liddell Power Station is smaller 
than this and potentially only suitable for 10MW, and is not in the optimum solar radiation area. 
Further investigations for appropriate location, probably west of the Hunter region should be 
made. CSP could also be used to avoid network augmentation in western NSW. 
3.8 Energy efficiency  
Improving energy efficiency is often referred to by analysts as the largest and cheapest energy 
resource, but it is often overlooked by policy makers and the media. 
A study from Lawrence Berkeley Lab in the US collected and analysed more than 5,400 
program years of data collected between 2009 and 2013 for energy efficiency programs run in 
36 US states. The data was collected from 78 administrators of programs funded by customers 
of investor-owned utilities. These administrators provide efficiency programs to customers of 
investor-owned utilities that serve about half of the total US electricity load. The programs 
included residential lighting, behaviour-based programs, whole home retrofits, and Commercial 
and Industry (C&I) custom and prescriptive rebate programs. The study found that the average 
cost to program administrators of saving a kilowatt-hour (kWh) was $0.028/kWh over the five-
year period (2009 to 2013) (Hoffman, Leventis and Goldman, 2017). Allowing for US inflation 
between 2013 and 2017 this equates to CPI/244.786/232.957 = 1.05 = $0.029/kWh in 2017. 
Given the current prevailing USD$ exchange rate (1USD = 1.30AUD), this gives a cost of 
AUD$0.038/kWh in 2017.  
An earlier LBNL report estimated the program administrator cost of energy efficiency at 
USD$0.023/kWh. This cost excludes the participant cost of the energy efficiency which was 
estimated at USD$0.022. The participant cost is generally regarded as less relevant, as these 
costs are undertaken voluntarily on the basis that the customers perceives net benefits in 
achieving energy efficiencies and considers that the additional benefits of energy efficiency 
outweigh the costs (Hoffman et al., 2015).     
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Another study undertaken by ACEEE examined 14 program administrators and found that 
seven of these achieved savings levels higher than 1.5 per cent of total energy consumption in 
consecutive years. Three of the seven sustained that level of savings for more than four years. 
As Figure 17 shows, average savings as a percentage of sales more than doubled from 0.8 per 
cent to 1.8 per cent, while the average levelised cost of saved energy, the per kilowatt-hour cost 
of energy over the lifetime of a program, remains relatively stable around 3.5 cents per kWh. 
This equates to about AUD4.7c /kWh or AUD$47 /MWh for energy savings, adjusted to 2017 
values. (Baatz and Gilleo, 2016) 
Figure 17: Average LCOE and incremental net savings 
 
Source: Baatz and Gilleo, 2016 
The NSW Energy Savings Scheme and the Victorian Energy Efficiency Discussion also 
evidence on the cost of energy efficiency improvements, with both schemes delivering large 
energy savings at a cost of about $20/MWh.  Extending or complementing these existing 
schemes at a national level could provide a very cost-effective means of providing the energy 
efficiency capacity discussed in the Clean Energy package and Energy Efficiency Only 
scenarios. 
The cost of delivering this energy efficiency improvement could be further reduced by 
expanding the existing building energy efficiency and appliance and equipment minimum 
energy performance standards.  
3.9 Demand Response  
Demand Response (DR) refers to customers reducing or shifting their electricity demand for 
short periods in response to financial incentives offered by utilities or other parties responsible 
for electricity supply.  
DR has been defined as “customer actions that are taken to reduce their metered electricity 
demand in response to an ‘event,’ e.g., a dispatch signal, whether in response to the high price 
of electricity, the reliability of the grid, or any other request for reduction from a grid operator, 
utility, or load aggregator” (Hledik and Faruqui, 2015).  
AEMO has noted that there is already significant DR in the NEM – approximately 950 MW of 
demand-side participation (DSP) capacity across the NEM (AEMO, 2017f).13 DSP can be 
rapidly deployed to complement potential supply-side market responses and provide greater 
contribution at peak demand times.  
                                                     
 
13 Customer responding to high price signals. 
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In order to estimate the cost of demand response, we have drawn on the current DR program 
conducted by ARENA and AEMO. The $35.7 million initiative will deliver 200 MW of capacity by 
2020, with 143 MW to be available for this upcoming summer. Including NSW funds, this 
amounts to $35.7million/(143MW +171MW +200MW14) = $69/kW.yr (AEMO, 2017c). 
Network businesses have already capitalised on new technologies that can offer programs to 
help reduce peak demand and network costs, with consumers rewarded for participating. For 
example, Energex offers a PeakSmart program for air conditioners, which enables these 
devices to reduce their energy consumption during periods of high demand. Air conditioners in 
participating households are fitted with a signal receiver. At times of high demand on the 
network, Energex’s control centre sends a signal, which reduces the device's energy 
consumption for a brief period. Households can claim a rebate of up to $400 off the cost of the 
air conditioner for participating in the program (Finkel et al., 2017). 
3.10 Time varying prices  
Time varying prices (TVP) for electricity refers to a range of strategies and approaches to vary 
electricity prices by time of day and time of year in response to demand and supply conditions. 
The higher that demand is relative to supply, the higher the prices are. Conversely, if supply is 
high relative to demand then prices should be lower.  There is a range of approaches to TVP 
including: 
• Discounted off-peak tariffs, which have existed in Australia since the 1930s, often on a 
separate dedicated circuit. 
• Time of use (ToU) pricing: A static ToU rate divides the day into time periods and 
provides a schedule of rates for each period, such as Peak, Shoulder, Off-peak. 
• Variable peak pricing: This is where a higher peak price is charged for rare and short 
periods of the highest relative peak demand.  Often, this will only be notified to 
customers the day before the event. This can include Critical Peak or “Dynamic Peak” 
Pricing.  
• Peak time rebate: Where there are regulatory or political barriers to setting time varying 
prices, an alternative is to offer rebates (or “negative prices”) for customers to reduce 
demand at peak times.  
Discounted off-peak tariffs are common in Australia, particularly for off-peak electric water 
heating. Time of Use pricing is available in most parts of Australia, but is still relatively 
uncommon, and the large majority of residential consumers are still on “flat tariffs”.   
The great value of TVP is that it encourages consumers to shift discretionary loads like storage 
water heating and pool pumps away from peak periods, thus reducing the need to invest in 
expensive new generation and network infrastructure to meet peak demand for only a few hours 
per year (AEMC, 2012). Figure 18 provides a summary of the impact on reducing peak demand 
of TVPs.  
  
                                                     
 
14 Note: 171MW is the assumed mid-point for between 143MW and 200MW for 2018/19. 
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Figure 18: Summary of peak demand reduction results from DSP trials in Australia 
 
Source: AEMC 2012 
The cost of offering time varying prices is likely to be low, but is difficult to estimate due to 
limited relevant precedents in Australia. One key cost is for the smart meters that allow for real-
time monitoring of electricity consumption. In 2013, the cost of such meters was estimated at 
less than $240 (Landis+Gyr, 2012).  
The current cost is likely be significantly less than this. Indeed, given that in some areas, smart 
meters are now the default replacements for aging meters, the net cost of installing smart 
meters is very low. Nonetheless, we have assumed a cost of $500/meter and a saving of 20 per 
cent or 0.5 kW per household.  As smart meters offer a range of other non-demand related 
benefits and cost savings to electricity suppliers (e.g. remote meter reading and connection and 
disconnection, improved fault detection and management), we have only attributed half of the 
cost of the meter to the introduction of time varying prices. This gives a capital cost of $500/kW 
or $59/kW/year. In addition, we have assumed an operating cost in the form of an incentive 
payment of $100/kW/year.  This cost could cover the cost of a customer “app” and/or in-home 
monitor to allow customers to respond effectively to TVP. 
It should be noted that as for Demand Response, TVP are effective in providing capacity, but do 
little if anything to provide energy. They are therefore an ideal complement to variable output 
renewables and energy efficiency.   
3.11 Other options 
There are further alternatives that could be considered in the mix of a clean energy scenario. 
These include large-scale solar PV or wind energy in combination with battery storage and 
sustainable bioenergy deployment. 
Bioenergy 
Bioenergy involves using organic matter or biomass to generate energy in the form of heat 
and/or electricity. There are extensive bioenergy resources in the large and well established 
agricultural and forestry areas across the state. NSW also has a large urban population that 
generates significant urban waste resources, landfill and sewage gas. The Hunter region has 
large cities in Newcastle, Port Stephens and Lake Macquarie. It has been estimated that the 
Hunter region will have a biomass potential of approximately 1,000 kilotons per annum in 2030. 
For the state as a whole, most of the biomass that could be used to generate heat and/or 
electricity is in the form of wood followed by waste, grasses and a small amount of crop residue 
(Wade, Barry and Nelson, 2016). It has to be noted that further research is needed to estimate 
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the potential for sustainably sourced biomass, and to ensure that no native forest biomass is 
considered.  
Bioenergy technology is well-established globally and in Australia. Currently, there are 34 
operational bioenergy power generators in NSW, and in 2015 they produced 1.5 per cent of the 
total electricity generated in the state (Wade, Barry and Nelson, 2016). There are biodiesel and 
biofuel facilities in various stages of commercialisation in the Hunter and central coast regions.  
A bio-renewables hub is being developed in Muswellbrook in the Hunter region (Bill, 2017). The 
region offers a large potential for bioenergy, as there are many under-utilised buffer lands and 
mine rehabilitation sites that could be used to grow biomass. There is significant potential for 
biomass to be a larger source of power generation than it currently is, including during peak 
demand periods.  
We have used Arup’s (2016, p. 139) estimates for dedicated biomass plant availability at 94 per 
cent, which reflects the time generators operating their assets. There has been an improvement 
reflecting progress in the way developers are operating generation assets, reducing plant 
downtime and improving maintenance regimes (Arup, 2016). A high firmness factor and a 
capacity factor of 85 per cent make biomass a reliable source of energy. We have used a 
capital cost of per kW installed of $4,700, which is the average of costs available from recent 
studies and published costs for existing plants (Yorke Biomass) (Stucley et al., 2012; IRENA, 
2015; Arup, 2016). 
Grid solar or wind energy paired with battery storage  
Other opportunities are associated with cheap renewable energy technologies such as solar PV 
and wind energy in combination with battery storage. While wind and solar are variable 
resources, the use of storage facilities increases their firmness and dispatchability. The costs of 
battery storage have significantly declined since 2015 and are expected to further drop in the 
next five years. Nonetheless, the capital costs are currently rather high in comparison to other 
technologies.  
3.12 Comparison of technology options 
There have been a number of recent comparisons of technologies for the supply of firm capacity 
and energy in the electricity sector. One comparison of the levelised costs of energy for various 
supply options is provided in Figure 19, from the Finkel Review, to which we have added a 
typical levelised cost of energy efficiency for comparison.  
Figure 19: Comparison of levelised cost for supply options, with energy efficiency added. 
 
Source: Amended from Finkel Review 2016, (Energy Efficiency added) 
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These results, and particularly the relative costs of energy efficiency, are confirmed in the data 
shown in Figure 20, from the American Council for and Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE).  
Figure 20: Comparison of costs of supply options and energy efficiency from ACEEE 
 
Source: ACEEE, 2016  
Note, however, that if capacity is the constraint on the system, then the levelised cost of energy 
is not the appropriate metric to compare options. This is illustrated Figure 21, which shows the 
results of modelling done for this report, comparing a set of technology options based on their 
relative costs of providing firm capacity, as distinct from the levelised cost of supplying energy. 
Figure 21: Costs of technology options to provide 1000 MW firm capacity   
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For the comparison of technology options for providing both firm capacity plus energy, the 
comparison is shown below in Figure 22.  
Figure 22:   Cost of options to provide 1000 MW firm capacity and 8000 MWh pa energy  
 
 
Source: ISF modelling. 
The underlying technology option unit costs for providing energy and firm capacity have been 



















N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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4 From options to credible scenarios  
In this section, we model a number of scenarios or technology packages, based on the 
technology options described above. These scenario packages were designed to address two 
different cases; a capacity-only constraint, and a capacity-and-energy constraint. 
The capacity-only case addresses only the reliability challenge described by AEMO, while the 
capacity and energy case addresses all four related challenges: ensuring reliability; putting 
downward pressure on electricity prices and bills, the longer-term transition associated with 
aging power stations; and the need for climate action. The capacity and energy case is 
therefore more relevant for meeting the long-term interests of consumers with respect to the 
price, quality, reliability and security of supply of energy services. 
4.1 Scenario 1: Extend Liddell 
This scenario explores the costs and impacts of the Commonwealth Government’s proposal to 
continue Liddell’s operations beyond 2022. Over a five-year period, the estimated cost of the 
extension is $3.6 billion, with two thirds attributed to energy costs and just one-third for capacity 
costs.  
Table 5: Scenario 1: Extend Liddell 
Extending the plant continues to provide a firm capacity of 1000 MW, generating 8,000 GWh of 
energy per annum. However, the technology does not have a very high capacity or firmness 
factor. Coal is not only an expensive fuel; it is also the most emission intensive option in this 
analysis, with an emission intensity of 1 tCO2 / MWh. It has the highest emissions among the 
considered scenarios amounting to 40.4 Mt CO2 over five years. This cost does not include the 
cost of pollution and carbon. Even at a modest carbon value of $10/t CO2e this would add $400 
million to the cost of the scenario.  
4.2 Scenario 2: AGL Proposal 
Prior to the Commonwealth Government proposal, AGL had already published a preliminary 
proposal to replace Liddell’s energy and firm capacity. This proposal was presented at the AGL 
Annual General meeting on 27 September 2017. The proposal identifies the need for 8,000 
GWh of energy per year and for 1,000 MW capacity. In order to meet this demand, the AGL 
proposal included: 
• increasing the capacity of the existing Bayswater Plant by 100 MW to provide about 
1,000 GWh of energy per annum 
• repurposing the Liddell site (and other potential sites in Newcastle) with a 750 MW high-
efficiency gas power plant to provide 1,000 GWh of energy per annum 
• bringing on board 1,600 MW of new renewables capacity (wind) to provide almost 6,000 
GWh energy per annum 
• providing 150 MW of firm capacity from battery storage and demand response. 
 








Total Cost in 
$m (5 years) 
Carbon 
Emissions in 
kt CO2 (5 
years) 
Coal (extend Liddell) 2,000 (1000) 8,000 3,586 40,400 
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Increase in MW 
Energy provided 
in GWh per 
annum 
Total Cost in $m 
(5 years) 
Carbon 
Emissions in kt 
CO2 (5 years) 
Upgrading Bayswater 
Plant 100 (100) ~1,000 420 - 
High Efficiency Gas 
fired plant 750 (750) ~1,000 1,153 2,400 
New Renewable 
Capacity 1,600 (50) 6,000 1,509 - 
Batteries & Demand 
Response 150 (150) - 222 80 
Total 2,600 (1050) 8,000 3,303 2,480 
ISF estimates the total cost of the project at $3.3 billion over a period of five years. Most of this 
cost (84 per cent) is the capacity cost15 of the new upgraded technologies, and 16 per cent is 
energy costs16 over this period. The energy costs are markedly lower than the previous scenario 
to Extend Liddell. This cost can further be split among the four alternative technologies 
proposed.  
In this scenario, the gas-fired plant replaces most of the firm capacity, contributing 75 per cent 
of the anticipated shortfall. The current Liddell site can be repurposed with high efficiency gas 
technologies, taking advantage of the existing infrastructure. There is also potential for gas 
development at Newcastle and other parts of the state that needs further investigating. The cost 
per kW of $186 per kW per annum for this proposed refurbishment is one of the lowest capacity 
costs in a range of proposed conventional and clean energy solutions. However, with the 
increasing cost of gas, the energy cost is fairly high, escalating the total cost of the energy 
generated to $1,153 million.   
The next element of this scenario is to upgrade the Bayswater coal-fired power station adjacent 
to Liddell to improve efficiencies and add 100 MW of capacity. Coal is an expensive source of 
energy in terms of both capital and energy costs. The total cost per unit is comparable to gas 
but the capital cost of coal is much higher, while gas has a much higher energy cost. As the 
anticipated capacity contribution of coal is small, the associated costs are moderate at $420 
million. It is assumed this will be achieved via efficiency improvements, so there are no 
additional emissions. 
Renewables, particularly wind, are expected to contribute 1,600 MW to overall capacity.  About 
653 MW of this is already under construction as part of the Coopers Gap and Silverton projects. 
The remaining 1,000 MW is expected to be fulfilled from within the AGL pipeline of developing 
projects. Though this estimate is large, as discussed in Section 3.4, wind energy has a fairly low 
capacity firmness of 3 per cent, compared to gas or grid-scale batteries that have a firmness 
factor of 92 per cent. Thus, the total firm capacity expected is only 50 MW but with a potential to 
generate over 6,000 GWh per annum.  
Firm capacity is the amount of energy available for production or transmission, which can be 
guaranteed to be available at a given time, for example during peak demand hours. Given the 
                                                     
 
15 Capacity cost refers to the investment in the technology distributed over the age of the plant and includes the capital cost, 
fixed operation and maintenance costs, network costs and any incentives provided. 
16 Energy costs include recurring costs like the fuel cost, variable operation and maintenance and any incentives provided. 
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variability associated with wind, the firmness factor is quite low. AEMO also takes an extremely 
conservative approach. This has an impact on the cost of the technology. Even though there 
are no energy costs for wind technology, the total cost showcases the high capacity cost of this 
option at $1,509 million.  
The final contribution comes from 50 MW batteries and 100 MW demand response. Both are 
characterised by a high firmness factor and a low capacity factor. Batteries have a high capacity 
cost adding $163 million to the cost of the project. Demand Response, on the other hand, will 
have low capacity costs but very high energy costs, contributing $59 million to the total cost of 
the project. Demand Response defers capital expenditure and can be progressively developed 
over the five-year time frame.   
In keeping with AGL’s commitment to manage carbon emissions as part of its Greenhouse Gas 
Policy, this scenario aims to reduce emissions by over 90 per cent to 2.5 Mt CO2e. This still 
attracts an additional carbon value of almost $25 million. 
4.3 Scenario 3: Clean Energy Package 
The primary Clean Energy Package provides another response to Liddell’s impending closure. It 
moves away from conventional coal and gas alternatives to a zero emission result with 
substantial cost savings compared to the baseline Extend Liddell scenario. In this scenario, the 
1000 MW shortfall is met through a combination of renewable energy options and demand 
management solutions. 




Increase in MW 
Energy provided 
in GWh per 
annum 
Total Cost in $m 
(5 years) 
Carbon 
Emissions in kt 
CO2 (5 years) 
Wind 600 (18) 2,288 543 - 
Energy Efficiency 1,000 (900) 6,027 1416 - 
Demand Response 250 (225) 5 133 - 
Time varying prices 250 (180) 0.1 143 - 
Total 2,050 (1323) 8,320 2,235 - 
This combination provides 1,300 MW of capacity and 8,300 GWh of energy, significantly 
exceeding the shortfall generated by Liddell’s closure. Energy efficiency is a low hanging fruit 
providing the majority of the incremental capacity with no capacity cost and a small energy cost. 
Similarly, employing time varying pricing strategies has a small capacity cost of smart meters 
and dispatch incentives. Thus, despite the high per unit costs of wind and demand response as 
seen in Scenario 2, the total cost over 5 years is only $2.23 billion. This is only 62 per cent of 
the cost of extending Liddell, creating savings of over $1.3 billion compared to Extend Liddell 
and $1.07 billion compared to the AGL proposal. Additionally, this clean energy package avoids 
over 40,000 kt CO2 putting downward pressure on prices, while contributing to the country’s 
Paris Climate Agreement commitments.   
 
4.4 Scenario 4: Expanded Clean Energy Package 
The Expanded Clean Energy Package comprises the same elements as Scenario 3 (Clean 
Energy Package) but also adds possible options that provide some regional development 
benefits.  
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Table 8: Scenario 4: Expanded Clean Energy Package 
The large cost saving relative of the primary Clean Energy Package compared to Extending 
Liddell and the AGL Proposal offers the opportunity to expand clean energy capacity further and 
diversify the capacity mix. This scenario includes solar thermal (with storage), batteries and 
bioenergy solutions. This enhances the firm capacity to 1,500 MW, providing more than 9,000 
GWh of energy per annum.  
As seen in AGL Proposal and the primary Clean Energy Package, wind is one of the more 
expensive options to provide firm capacity due to its low capacity firmness. In comparison, solar 
thermal with storage is more expensive in terms of energy produced, but provides much more 
firm capacity. In Scenario 4, the Expanded Clean Energy Package, solar thermal with storage 
contributes almost five times the firm capacity of wind, but the total cost is less than half that of 
wind. Solar thermal solutions coupled with storage can be deployed near power lines in western 
NSW where conditions are ideal in terms of the availability of large, flat and inexpensive land 
with an excellent solar resource.  
Another component of this scenario is to add batteries to existing residential PV installations. 
The Hunter and Central Coast region has a fair penetration of 16 percent17 of household solar 
installations. Addition of batteries for these existing installations can add another 100 MW of 
capacity. As with most storage options, there is a moderately high capacity cost, which is 
expected to come down in the coming years, and no direct energy cost.  
The final component in this scenario is repurposing the current Liddell site for bioenergy using 
locally grown sustainable biomass. This option allows for using the existing infrastructure as 
well as land and mine site rehabilitation through biomass cultivation.    
The total cost of this Expanded Clean Energy Package scenario is $3.1 billion, still resulting in a 
saving of almost $470 million over the five years relative to the Extend Liddell scenario. The 
Expanded Clean Energy Package is not the lowest cost scenario, but is likely to offer the 
greatest co-benefits in terms of emission reduction, land rehabilitation and local economic 
activity. 
  
                                                     
 
17 Calculated from data sourced from the Clean Energy Regulator and APVI 
Technology Option Installed (Firm) 
Capacity 
Increase in MW 
Energy provided 
in GWh per 
annum 
Total Cost in $m 
(5 years) 
Carbon 
Emissions in kt 
CO2 (5 years) 
Wind 600 (18) 2,288 543 - 
Solar Thermal 100 (85) 552 253 - 
Bioenergy 50 (47) 372 249 - 
Batteries  100 (90) -- 163 - 
Energy Efficiency 1,000 (900) 6,027 1,416 - 
Demand Response 250 (225) 5 133 - 
Time varying prices 250 (180) 0.1 143 - 
Total 2,300 (1,545) 9,244 3,114 - 
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4.5 Scenario 5: Energy Efficiency Only 
The Energy Efficiency Only scenario relies solely on improved end use energy efficiency to 
provide firm capacity and energy.   
Table 9: Scenario 5: Energy Efficiency Only Package 
Australian and overseas experience indicates that this is a credible and viable alternative to 
extending the life of Liddell Power Station. However, the relatively low level of engagement on 
issues of energy efficiency and energy productivity in Australia means that policy makers and 
the community are likely to be sceptical of relying solely on energy efficiency as a solution. For 
this reason, we have chosen to limit the capacity of energy efficiency in the primary Clean 
Energy Alternative to only 1,000 MW of installed capacity. The total cost of the Energy 
Efficiency Only scenario is $1.9 billion, which is 47 per cent less than for the Extend Liddell 
scenario, resulting in savings of almost $1.7 billion over the five years.   
4.6 Comparison of scenarios  
This section shows the relative costs (total costs over five years) for the scenario packages, for 
the two different outcomes: capacity only, or capacity plus energy. The total carbon emissions 
expected over five years for each scenario package are also shown. 
Firstly, in the capacity-only analysis, we compare three scenarios in Figure 23. 
Figure 23: Capacity only analysis of scenarios  
 













































Technology Option Installed (Firm) 
Capacity 





Total Cost in 
$m (5 years) 
Carbon 
Emissions in kt 
CO2 (5 years) 
Energy Efficiency 1,333 (1200) 8,036 1,888 - 
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If only capacity is considered, the AGL proposal is the lowest cost of the three primary 
scenarios considered.  Note however, that in this capacity only case, significant energy 
generation is not required, so AGL’s proposed 1600 MW of new wind generation is excluded 
from the scenario and the associated the energy output, capacity and cost are also excluded. 
Figure 24 shows the results for the analysis of capacity and energy case, for the same three 
primary scenarios. 
Figure 24: Comparison of capacity and energy outcomes analysis  
 
Source: ISF modelling. 
Figure 25, shows the analysis for capacity-plus-energy outcomes for five scenario packages, 
adding the Expanded Clean Energy package (with regional development additions) as well as 
an energy efficiency-only package. 
Figure 25 also illustrates the cost impact of associated carbon emissions, based on a modest 
carbon price of $10/tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent. Note that the carbon value does not 
impact on the clean energy or energy efficiency scenarios as they have zero emission. This 
carbon value is the cost applied to carbon pollution to encourage polluters to reduce the amount 
of greenhouse gas they emit into the atmosphere. It helps shift the burden for damage due to 
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Figure 25: Comparison of capacity and energy outcomes analysis  
 
Source: ISF modelling. 
The following charts provide a breakdown of the technology options in the various scenarios in 
the Capacity and Energy case.  Figure 26 presents the technology mix that comprises the costs 
over five years for each of the five scenarios. This includes capital and operating costs.  
Figure 27 illustrates the technology mix of the five scenarios as a share of the annual energy 
output. The significant contribution of renewable and clean energy options like wind and 
demand response is evident in the AGL Scenario. Note that the clean energy scenarios provide 
more energy than the Extend Liddell scenario. In fact, the Expanded Clean Energy package 
considerably exceeds the required 8000 GWh pa. 
Similarly, Figure 28 and Figure 29 represent the installed capacity and firm capacity of the 
different technologies in each of the scenarios. As discussed above in Section 3.3.4., the firm 
capacity for wind is much smaller than the installed capacity, while for technology options like 
batteries and demand response the difference is modest.  It is clear that the alternative 
scenarios proposed fill the capacity gap created by the forecast closure of Liddell power station. 
The Clean Energy Scenarios offer higher capacities for significantly lower costs, and therefore 
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Figure 26: Technology Mix for Scenarios – Capacity and Energy Cost Analysis 
 
Source: ISF modelling. 
Figure 27: Technology Mix for Scenarios – Energy 
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Figure 28: Technology Mix for Scenarios – Installed Capacity 
 
Source: ISF modelling. 
Figure 29: Technology Mix for Scenarios – Firm Capacity 
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5 Managing local economic and social 
transition 
5.1 What is a just transition? 
A “just transition” ensures environmental sustainability as well as decent work, social inclusion 
and poverty eradication (Smith, 2017) in the process of industrial or economic change. The 
Paris Climate Agreement has emphasised the “imperative of a just transition of the workforce 
and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined 
development priorities“ (UN, 2015). Different stakeholders apply the just transition term in 
different ways. The Australian Council of Trade Unions particularly emphasises that previous 
industry transitions were often poorly executed in Australia, with workers and communities 
bearing the brunt of the change – suffering hardship, unemployment and generations of 
economic and social depression (ACTU, 2016).  
A just transition is considered to be a process of social and economic restructuring “which 
aspires to move the region’s socio-ecological relationships rapidly towards sustainability through 
protecting the wellbeing of vulnerable workers, communities and ecosystems” (Evans, 
2009).  Indeed, a fair transition to climate-safe technologies addresses three main dimensions: 
firstly, the environmental impact; secondly, the equitable sharing of responsibilities and costs 
across society; and thirdly, a fair sharing of the benefits with communities actively co-creating 
the transition process.  In this section, we look at what is needed to ensure a just transition for 
Liddell workers and the broader Hunter community. 
5.2 Why is a just transition important? 
Over the past five years ten coal-fired power stations have shut down in Australia, with an 
average of just four months’ notice given to workers and communities (see Table 1).  This has 
meant that the communities around these power stations, and the workers employed there, 
have had little time to develop plans for alternative industries or employment.  The shutdown of 
a power station like Liddell that employs 600 people (shared between Bayswater and Liddell 
Power Station), has huge implications for the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of people.   
By providing more than five years’ notice of its intention to shut Liddell, AGL has given itself, its 
workers, the community and all levels of government time to put in place detailed plans for 
supporting the community and affected workers to make the transition away from coal 
power.  However, it is imperative that this five-year period not be wasted. Work must begin now 
to develop alternative economic plans, and to begin retraining and other initiatives.   
5.3 What are the options for renewable economic renewal in 
the Hunter? 
The coal industry is a sector in transition. The international trend towards low-carbon societies 
is leading to the gradual phasing out of coal-fired power stations around the world. In particular, 
the more advanced economies of the OECD nations continue to reduce their reliance on coal-
fired electricity generation (Smith, 2017). Hence, it is becoming obvious that the closure of the 
Liddell Power Station will only be the beginning of a broader transition in the Hunter Valley. 
Other fossil fuel-fired power stations will likely be phased out in the coming decades.  Yet, a 
transition also offers opportunities; a solution oriented approach would see the creation of new 
sectors with new jobs – in particular in the renewable energy field. 
A just transition for any industry in decline should involve broad-based local economic planning 
covering a range of sectors from health and education, agriculture, alternative industries and 
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more.  However, in the case of transitions in the energy sector, there are significant potential 
Hunter-based opportunities related to the different clean energy options modelled in this report. 
These opportunities, if implemented well, could drive new jobs.  However, we note that ensuring 
these are decent and well-paid new jobs will require long-term planning and support. 
Energy efficiency and demand response 
Energy efficiency and demand response are the two major pillars of the clean energy scenario 
in this report. Since manufacturing and installation of energy efficient equipment and materials, 
and the provision of energy efficiency services are relatively labour-intensive, this sector could 
boost the local labour market. In fact, a report from Cambridge Econometrics (2015) suggests 
that ‘investment in energy efficiency could create up to twice as many jobs as investment in new 
energy generation’. However, it has to be noted that the skills required are often quite specific, 
and hence policy programs to train and build up capacity in the local workforce are important 
(Cambridge Econometrics, 2015). 
Household solar and storage 
The Hunter community has started to embrace the new technologies with 49,143 solar homes 
and 156 MW of solar PV installed in the Hunter region (Australian PV Institute, 2017). Table 10 
shows that an average of 16 per cent of all houses in the Hunter have solar systems installed. 
This provides great potential for the deployment of complementary battery storage systems at 
these premises. Indeed, supporting the adoption of battery storage in the region could help 
households to further cut their electricity bills, improve energy affordability and provide local 
employment for battery installation, sales, maintenance and operation. 








Upper Hunter Shire 6183 834 12.5% 3916 
Muswellbrook 6242 835 12.5% 3914 
Singleton 8494 1437 16% 6770 
Dungog 3800 742 18.6% 2818 
Gloucester 2503 554 21.2% 1961 
Great Lakes 16764 3393 19.9% 9723 
Port Stephens 28866 5178 17.6% 15620 
Maitland 25265 4511 17.3% 16406 
Cessnock 20107 3273 15.8% 11303 
Newcastle 55297 7306 12.9% 22321 
Lake Macquarie 74356 11830 15.7% 35136 
Wyong 60515 9250 15.1% 26255 
Total 308392 49143 15.9%  156143 
Source: Australian PV Institute (2017). 
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Large-scale wind and large-scale solar plus storage 
In addition, large-scale renewable energy deployment also has development potential in the 
region. There are currently a number of large-scale projects under construction, including the 
Kyoto Energy Park with a 137 MW solar farm and 34 wind turbines, and the 272 turbine 
Liverpool Range Wind Farm planned by Epuron. 
Indeed, the Australian Wind Alliance reports that more than 1,000MW of wind and solar are 
currently being built in NSW, with a further 2,600MW of projects approved and starting 
construction (Ecogeneration 2017). The Climate Institute (2017) estimates that the Upper 
Hunter will benefit from the renewable energy boom with up to 866 new jobs, including 273 
ongoing jobs and a peak construction workforce of 593. 
The combination of cheap large-scale renewables with storage solutions, as recommended by 
Finkel et al. (2017), will further help to make the system more reliable, reduce electricity bills 
and potentially boost the grid-scale battery industry in the state. 
Other opportunities  
In addition, there are other opportunities such as solar thermal and sustainable bioenergy 
deployment. The example from Port Augusta shows what can happen when a coal community 
works with a range of partners to develop a clean energy future powered by decent jobs (see 
box below for details). There may be some small potential for solar thermal in the Hunter, 
particularly given the expertise available at the CSIRO in Newcastle.  However, recent research 
by Ethanol Technologies Limited (Ethtec), Newcastle University and Muswellbrook Shire 
Council shows there is potential to transforming the Upper Hunter region into a national bio-
renewables hub.  
 
Case Study – Repowering Port Augusta 
In August 2017 a 150-megawatt solar thermal plant with storage was announced for construction in 
the South Australian town of Port Augusta. This moment was the culmination of over five years of 
work by the local community to ensure the town’s coal-fired power stations would be replaced with 
a concentrated solar thermal plant. Only a year before, Port Augusta’s two coal power plants, 
Northern and Playford B, had shut their doors, without a transition plan in place. 
"It was a fairly rude shock to most people – because they'd been saying it would be 2030 only 
months earlier," says Gary Rowbottom, a technical officer who worked at Alinta’s power 
station.  Gary is also chairperson for the Repower Port Augusta community group which has been 
leading the solar campaign alongside the city council, unions, local business groups, health groups, 
climate groups and renewable energy groups across Australia. 
On the day of the announcement, resident and Repower Port Augusta spokesperson Lisa Lumsden 
said, “Premier Weatherill and the South Australian Government backing solar thermal in Port 
Augusta is a testament to the hard work and generous spirit of our community and everyone who 
has stood with us to make this happen. This will help us build a bright new future in Port Augusta 
and will ensure South Australia has clean, renewable electricity 24/7”. 
What has happened in Port Augusta offers many lessons about both what to do and what not to do 
in driving a just transition from coal to clean energy.  There are plenty of opportunities for clean 
energy in the Hunter; the question is what governments at all levels, AGL, the local community and 
others will do to help make these opportunities a reality. 
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5.4 Driving a just transition for Liddell workers and the 
community 
To ensure a just transition for communities and workers in and around Liddell, we strongly 
recommend that AGL work with all levels of government to implement the following 
recommendations.   
• Coal-fired power station owners in the Hunter region including AGL should work with 
the local councils, NSW and Commonwealth Government to establish an independent 
statutory authority in the Hunter region responsible for a just transition. This authority 
should be similar to the newly established Latrobe Valley Authority and have 
responsibility for implementing programs to assist economic diversification and ensure 
workers and communities are retrained and supported through the period of change. It 
is important that such a Hunter Transition Authority is a statutory body empowered by 
legislation. This ensures it has a mandate that outlasts changes in government and 
short term political factors to deliver a steady transition plan and provide certainty for 
communities and workers.  
• The Hunter Transition Authority should be tasked with developing an industry wide 
multi-employer pooled redeployment scheme that coordinates early offers of voluntary 
redundancies in nearby coal-fired power stations to free up positions for workers from 
Liddell as it closes, and also facilitates transfer to renewable energy jobs, particularly 
within other divisions of AGL.  
• A “Job Hub” should be developed to provide retraining and worker support before 
Liddell closes. 
• The Hunter Transition Authority should facilitate programs that support the entire 
community through closure of Liddell and beyond and drive industry diversification in 
the Hunter.  This could include establishing community-driven economic renewal plans 
such as expanding the work on creating a national bio-renewables hub, as well as 
extending support to other local industries and the families of affected workers, for 
example through making mental health services available.  
• The NSW Government should ensure that all owners of all power station in the Hunter 
region including Liddell meet their obligations for full decommissioning of, including site 
remediation. Further, they should ensure that Liddell workers have first priority to these 
employment opportunities. Since the Paris Climate Agreement, the world has come to 
expect companies such as AGL to have a plan to lower their emissions to ensure that 
warming is kept well below 2°C.  In addition, we are starting to expect that this plan also 
include a just transition for the company’s workforce and communities where the 
company operates. 
• AGL’s recently released Rehabilitation Report (AGL Energy Limited, 2017) and its 
Transition Plan are valuable contributions in progressing these issues, but the process 
will be long and complex and will require meaningful engagement of stakeholders from 
government, community and business. 
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6 Conclusions 
There are a number of key implications and conclusions that can be drawn from this study. 
 
First, clarify the problem 
The electricity system is changing rapidly and it is appropriate that Commonwealth and state 
governments take steps to adjust policies and regulations in response. There are legitimate 
concerns around the closure of Liddell Power Station related to: 
• impacts on available supply capacity (MW) and reliability of supply 
• impacts on energy production output (GWh pa) and consequent potential impacts on 
electricity prices and bills 
• precedents associated with Liddell and what this may mean for the subsequent 
expected closure of other coal-fired power stations over the next 15 years.   
In addition, these constraints must be addressed in the context of Australia’s stated 
commitments under the Paris Climate Agreement. 
It is also crucial that the specific challenges be clearly defined so that optimal least-cost 
solutions can be developed in a timely manner. In order to address the above constraints, it is 
important that any response addresses peak capacity and energy requirements 
 
Set policy to address the objectives and outcomes; allow the market to 
operate 
The electricity market is complex and dynamic.  The generation and retail sector has been 
established based on competitive principles. In order to deliver efficient and low cost outcomes 
for consumers, it is essential that policies focus on clear and stable policy settings that promote 
investor confidence and encourage competition. The proposed National Energy Guarantee has 
potential to offer such high-level, clear, stable, outcomes-focussed policy guidance. Prescriptive 
government intervention around individual investment decisions, such as extending the life of 
Liddell Power Station, would undermine investor and market confidence, even if the investment 
decision was prudent.  
Any policy related to the potential extension of the life of Liddell Power Station should be linked 
to clear policy objectives around reliability, affordability, sustainability and optimising economic 
transition for the local community and the nation. 
 
Extending the life of Liddell is expensive and not prudent 
Based on the available evidence, extending the life of Liddell Power Station is not a prudent 
response to the challenges associated with the impending closure of Liddell. 
Extending the life of Liddell would be a poor outcome which, over a five-year period, could cost 
energy consumers and the community $1billion more than a Clean Energy Alternative. It is likely 
to be a more risky, much more polluting option that would do little to support the inevitable 
economic transition in the region. 
 
Responsibility for electricity market outcomes should be clear 
Any policy related to the potential extension of the life of Liddell Power station should be linked 
to clear policy objectives around reliability, affordability, sustainability and optimising economic 
transition for the local community and the nation.  
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As Liddell and its owner AGL are operating in a competitive electricity market, the 
Commonwealth government should adopt competitively neutral policies that treat all market 
participants equitably.  It is not the responsibility of AGL to replace the capacity and energy 
output of Liddell Power Station. It would be inefficient and anti-competitive to expect or oblige it 
to do so. 
 
Other policy responses are urgently required 
Some of the best options for replacing the capacity and energy of Liddell Power Station are 
beyond the control of AGL and require effective government policy. For example, energy 
efficiency, demand response and time varying pricing all require government policy to ensure 
they are given a fair opportunity to compete. 
 
Liddell closure can provide a template for low-cost, clean energy 
transition  
There are real and legitimate concerns about the closure of Liddell Power Station, particularly in 
the context of other recent coal power station closures and future expected closures. This 
demands a considered strategic response as the proportion of coal generation declines and the 
proportion of variable output renewable energy rises. 
There are viable and practical technologies and policies available to facilitate a smooth, low-
cost reliable transition that supports the local economy and community. 
If such technologies and policies are adopted, the Liddell Power Station closure could provide a 
powerful model for how the economy and the community can successfully manage the current 
energy transition.  
 
Further potential research areas 
Drawing on this study, further detailed analysis and consultation is urgently required to develop 
practical clean energy alternatives to extending the life of Liddell Power Station. This analysis 
and consultation should include: 
• A thorough and balanced assessment of the potential and cost of all available 
options to provide both peak capacity and energy. This should include all relevant 
supply-side and demand-side options. It should also consider integrated packages 
of solutions and community engagement strategies, as well as individual technology 
options. 
• Developing detailed policy and programs to drive energy efficiency and time varying 
pricing in the context of the future energy market. (These options were largely 
neglected in the recent Finkel Review.)  
• Developing detailed policies and programs to support local economic transition for 
communities around those coal-fired power stations that are expected to close over 
the next 15 years. 
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